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En este documento se identifica al trabajador informal como aquel que no contribuye al sistema de 
seguridad social. Se analiza la probabilidad de ser informal y se estima el diferencial de remuneraciones 
entre sectores, utilizando tanto estimaciones MCO como un modelo de regresiones intercambiables 
(switching regression). Con ello se evalúa el diferencial por ser formal, recurriendo al cálculo de cinco 
proxies de la brecha promedio entre sectores. Se utiliza la información de la Encuesta Continua de 
Hogares relevada por el Instituto Nacional de Estadística en el año 2005. Se encuentra que la 
formalidad es más probable para los trabajadores con mayor nivel educativo, para las mujeres, los 
residentes en la capital, los jefes de hogar y los trabajadores tiempo completo. Además, de acuerdo a las 
cinco medidas de la brecha, se encuentra que las remuneraciones son mayores para los trabajadores 
formales que para los informales. 
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Abstract 
In this paper we define informal workers as those who are not contributing to the social security 
system. We analyse the likelihood of being informal and we estimate the differentials in earnings 
between sectors using both the OLS estimation and a switching regression model. We assess the 
premium for being formal by predicting five different proxies of the average gap. We use the cross-
section data reported in a 2005 household survey. We find that formality is more likely among the 
better-educated, women, people residing in the capital city, heads of households and full-time workers. 
In addition, we find that according to the five measures of the gap, earnings are higher in the formal 
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Introduction 
Although there is no universally accepted definition of informality, there is an understanding 
that the informal labour market has specific identifiable characteristics. In the first academic studies, 
informality was defined as small-scale and lack of organization in a business (Hart, 1971). Sethuraman 
(1976) added some other characteristics, such as lack of access to credit from financial institutions or 
the lack of a fixed labour schedule. On the other hand , in its well-known report about Kenya in 1972, 
the ILO defined informality as activities that did not comply with tax legislation.     
Both of these traditional definitions appear in Latin American studies. According to Tokman 
(1978; 1987), the informal sector is made up of units that operate on a small scale and with low levels of 
organization, and with little division between labour and capital (Tokman, 1978; 1987).  In line with this 
theoretical concept, several Latin American empirical studies on informality identified informal workers 
as those who are employed in small enterprises, self-employed, or unpaid family members. Among its 
more salient characteristics, informality has been linked to non-compliance with labour regulations.  
Alternatively, following Portes, Castells & Benton (1989), other studies have defined 
informality as economic activities that do not comply with government regulations but are not illegal. 
From the labour perspective, this definition identifies informal workers as those for whom labour 
regulations are not applied or enforced in a context where workers in similar activities are subject to 
regulation. This definition raises some practical problems about identifying the relevant labour 
regulation to be taken into account. In any case, coverage by the social security system is one of the 
traditional empirical definitions. Once again, there is a link between the two concepts of informality: 
evidence has shown that lack of regulation enforcement is more likely to prevail in small units.  
According to both these approaches, unit size and regulation evasion, informality is widespread 
in Latin America. Indeed, the annual ILO “Labour Overview” for Latin America and the Caribbean 
used the concept of firm size and estimated that in recent years around 45% of the labour force was 
informal. The regulation evasion approach showed that around 55% of the urban labour force in Latin 
America was not contributing to the social security system in recent years (ECLAC, 2006). Perry et al 
(2007) made estimations using different measures, and with all of them found a high degree of 
informality. However, these authors also analysed the correlation between GDP and informality for 
several countries and concluded that the level of informality in Latin America is not especially high for 
its development level.    4
A number of Latin American studies have focused on the debate about the nature of the 
informal sector. In the context of dualistic models, several authors have argued that informality stems 
from the restrictions faced by workers who are unable to find a job in the formal sector. This means 
they are in the informal sector with worse working conditions and receiving lower pay than formal 
workers who share the same characteristics. In addition, some authors have argued that at least part of 
the increase in informality in Latin America has stemmed from large modern enterprises that avoid 
labour regulation costs by subcontracting unprotected workers who work in little units. Once again, 
they see informality as the disadvantaged segment of a dual labour market. 
An alternative approach is to see informality as a choice made by workers and firms for whom 
the cost of regulations in the formal sector is not attractive. People may choose informality because the 
benefits of regulation are not well targeted, or because of workers’ myopia or as a transitory state, i.e. as 
an entry point in business activity. In any case, the informal sector is a result of an efficiency allocation 
of labour in a context of institutions’ inability to enforce regulations.  
Latin American empirical studies focusing on this debate have adopted different strategies, and 
the results as regards the relevance of each interpretation are not conclusive. One strategy was to 
analyse the likelihood of being informal in order to explore whether workers are negatively selected in 
the informal sector, given their skills. Pisani & Pagan (2004) defined informality on the basis of unit size 
and analysed the selection between sectors in Nicaragua in 1993 and 1998 using a switching regression 
model. They found that low education and being female were the main determinants of participation in 
the informal economy. A positive selectivity in both the formal and informal sectors –although non-
significant for women- led the authors to conclude that each sector attracts the workers best suited to 
that sector.   
Auerbach, Genoni & Pagés (2005) studied the characteristics of contributors and non-
contributors to the social security system in several Latin American countries. They found that in all 
these countries the likelihood of not contributing to the social security system was higher for the 
unskilled, the young, married women, workers in households with many active members and many 
informal workers, people living in rural areas, and part-time and low paid workers. They concluded that 
the low rate of contribution was partly due to demand factors such as individual preferences. However, 
the results also suggested that informality was in some cases the result of rationing in the formal sector, 
as in the case of workers earning less than a minimum wage.   
Another strategy has been to estimate the earnings gap between sectors. According to the 
dualistic view, we should expect lower earnings in the informal sector. A positive informal premium 
may be interpreted as a differential that compensates for the lack of regulation benefits.  Marcouiller, 
Ruiz de Castilla & Woodruff (1997) did not evaluate the presence of segmentation, but they estimated   5
the formal-informal wage gap for El Salvador, Peru and Mexico using cross-section data. They found 
there was a positive formal sector wage premium for the first two countries but not for Mexico. 
Saavedra & Chong (1999) found that in Peru, earnings differentials were negligible in the case of self-
employed workers, but formal wage earners were better off than informal ones. Pratap & Quintin 
(2003) estimated the earnings gap for Argentina and did not find evidence of a formal sector premium.  
Maloney (1999) pursued another strategy that took advantage of longitudinal data, and this 
enabled him to analyse mobility patterns in Mexico. He concluded that these patterns were consistent 
with informality being a desirable option rather than a disadvantaged segment of a dualistic market.  
 In this paper we use cross-section data to study the probability of being informal and the 
informal earnings gap in Uruguay. We choose the regulation approach and, as a practical matter, we 
define informal workers as those who do not contribute to the social security system. The rest of the 
paper is organized as follows. In the first section we give a brief description of the social security 
system and the results of previous studies of informality in Uruguay. In the second section we present 
the characteristics of the data and the methodology. In the third section we present the results, and this 
includes a description of the main data, an estimation of the likelihood of being informal, and the 
earnings gap between sectors. Finally, we present our conclusions.    
1. A review of informality in Uruguay  
1.1. Institutional background 
In Uruguay, the social security system was set up at the end of the 19th century on the basis of 
specific occupations’ contributory programs that offered retirement pensions in a pay-as-you-go 
financial regime. Since then, the social security system has incorporated new programmes covering 
other risks. The coverage provided by contributory programmes was gradually extended to other 
occupations until it covered the whole of the workforce. This development meant a big increase in the 
number of programmes, and these were finally unified in a single system. Indeed, today there are only a 
very few occupations that still have their own programmes - police and armed forces personnel, bank 
employees and university graduates - and most of the system is administered by a public institution (the 
Banco de Prevision Social-BPS).  
The BPS administers two funds. One of them (the IVS fund) covers the risk of retirement, 
death, unemployment and disability, and the other (the DISSE fund) covers maternity, sickness and 
medical benefits. In any case, these funds are not separately administered. In addition, the BPS has had 
a global budget deficit, and in recent years half of its expenditure has been supported from general 
taxes.    6
The main expenditure of the IVS fund is the Old Age, Disability and Survivors Programme. 
This covers all employed and self-employed persons, including rural and domestic workers. Since 1996, 
when the social security system was reformed, it has been a mixed social insurance and individual 
account system. There are two possible situations. First, workers below a certain threshold contribute 
to the pay-as-you-go regime unless they explicitly choose to deposit half their contributions in an 
individual account. Second, workers with higher income must contribute to the social insurance pillar 
up to the threshold and save in an individual account for the amount above that threshold, up to a 
ceiling. Above this ceiling, contributions to the individual account pillar are voluntary.  
A worker’s contribution is 15% of his monthly earnings. In the case of the self-employed, there 
is a minimum declared monthly income for contribution purposes, that is, a minimum contribution. 
Employers have to contribute 12.5% of their total payroll to the social insurance pillar, but there are 
several exemptions and rate reductions and these make for a complex rate structure. The rates are 
somewhat higher for public servants.  
This contribution to the IVS fund also entitles contributors to the benefits from the 
unemployment insurance and family allowance programmes. However, access to these benefits is 
restricted by the eligibility requirements. The unemployment insurance scheme targets loss of work by 
privately-employed persons, but the self-employed are explicitly excluded. The benefit consists of a 
payment for six months of 50% of the average earnings received in the six months before 
unemployment. The family allowances programme involves a means test, and it also covers private 
employees but not the self-employed (except for some specific occupations, namely domestic service, 
newspaper vendors and small rural product vendors).     
As regards the DISSE fund, the employee contribution is 3% of monthly earnings and the 
employer contribution is 5% of the payroll.  The rate of contribution for self-employed workers is 8%. 
Contribution entitles workers to sickness benefits that amount to 70% of earnings and this is paid for 
up to one year, and to maternity benefits amounting to 100% of earnings for twelve weeks (six weeks 
before and six week after the expected date of childbirth). In addition, contributors may qualify for 
some in-kind benefits such a pre-natal care. The main medical benefit consists in the financing of 
health care in the private sector. The private health system is made up of different medical schemes 
among which the most important is the mutual insurance system that offers health services through a 
number of institutions. Membership of this system requires a monthly fee. Contributors to DISSE 
choose a mutual insurance institution and the DISSE fund pays the monthly fee.  
 When non-contribution takes place, we may infer that other labour costs are also avoided. 
Besides contributions, labour costs include compulsory insurance to cover work injury risk, and two 
taxes.  One tax amounts to 0.25% of monthly earnings, the burden is shared equally by employers and   7
employees, and the funds are used to finance active labour programmes. The other is a progressive tax 
on earnings: 2% from 2 to 6 minimum wages and 6% for higher earnings; and employees have to pay 
an additional 1%. In the case of some occupations, contributions, taxes and work injury taxes are paid 
all together when contributing to the social security system.   
Informality means that some people do not enjoy the benefits of the contributory systems. 
However, there are assistance programmes that provide benefits for non-contributors. A review of 
these benefits may suggest that contributory programmes might not be attractive enough, at least for 
some workers. 
Public institutions provide free health care for the poor - i.e. medical services, medicines, 
hospitalisation, etc. Note that although the monthly fee for the mutual insurance scheme is paid by the 
contributory programme, each time the person makes use of the service he still has to make a payment. 
Thus, the contributory program is more onerous than public services. In any case, two features limit the 
use of public services: the fact that they involve a means test, and the widespread perception that they 
are of poorer quality than services in the private sector.  
In addition, there is a family allowances programme whereby informal workers with children 
receive a payment when the household’s income is below a threshold. This programme was created in 
2004, and in 2005 its impact on poverty and income distribution was very limited because the transfer 
and the threshold were both low (Vigorito, 2005). There is also an assistance programme for poor, non-
active elderly persons who are not receiving a pension from the contributory programme. This 
assistance programme has always provided lower benefits than the contributory programme; indeed, in 
2005, the average assistance pension was 42% of the average contributory pension. 
Finally, the most widely-quoted disincentive to contribution is the weakness of eligibility 
requirement controls when people pay into the contributory pension scheme. Until 1996, there was no 
registration of individual contributions. The lack of administrative records meant that witness testimony 
about contribution history had to be allowed. There is a general perception that this procedure resulted 
in retirements that did not comply with the minimum of required years of contribution (Camacho, 
1997; Rius, 2003). We may speculate that this situation undermined incentives to formality.  
In 1996, when the individual account pillar was introduced, a labour history register was 
created. At that time, there was a belief that the introduction of an individual account pillar and the 
stringency of the enforcement system –based on the labour history register- would both work to reduce 
informality. However, non-contribution increased, particularly in 1999-2002 when the labour market 
was affected by a severe downturn in economic activity. In 2005, two years after economic recovery 
began, informal workers accounted for around 38% of employment.    8
1.2. Previous studies 
In Uruguay, economics studies on informality appeared later than in the other Latin American 
countries. The first studies relied on the unit size definition and focused on the duality hypothesis. 
Indeed, Diez de Medina & Gerstenfeld (1986) concluded that informality should be viewed as the 
disadvantaged segment of a dual labour market. Also Grosskoff & Melgar (1990) found some evidence 
consistent with the dual hypothesis. 
Although these studies suggested that the concept of informality would be relevant in a context 
of dual labour markets, the subject did not attract many other studies. As Grzetich & Mezzera (1994) 
pointed out, this definition of informality in Uruguay may be revised because the average size of firms 
is small and many self-employed people have high education levels. Probably these features, and the 
fact that so-called informal workers tend to be rather heterogeneous, discouraged empirical work on 
the subject. Recently, Amarante & Espino (2007) classified workers according to unit size and 
contribution to the social security system, and studied several dimensions of labour quality and the 
density functions of earnings. They concluded that social security coverage allows a classification with 
more in-group homogeneity than does the unit size criterion.  
On the other hand, social security coverage has been studied more frequently, mainly because it 
is linked to the question of the financial sustainability of the pension programme. In addition, the 
change of rules that came with the setting up of the labour history system, and the fact that the number 
of workers with coverage was declining, have both acted as a spur to some recent studies.  
The fact that labour history records are available has made it possible to study entry into and 
exit from the social security system. Lagomarsino & Lanzilotta (2004) analysed the frequency of 
individual contributions over ten years, and its determinants. They found that attachment to the social 
security system was higher for men than for women and for public servants than for private workers. 
In addition, membership increased with income and with age. Bucheli, Forteza & Rossi (2005) used 
social security records to estimate the predicted number of contributions accumulated at advanced ages 
(over 60 years old), and they also found differences between the public and private sectors and among 
workers with different earning levels. 
Bucheli (2004) used a series of cross-section data (household surveys) to analyse the evolution 
of the contributor rate between 1991 and 2002 and contributor profile. This study concluded that at the 
beginning of the period, the likelihood of contributing was higher for prime ages, for the lowest 
education levels and for men. During the period, the educational gap increased and the gender gap 
narrowed until the rate was similar for both sexes in 2002.    9
Some studies focused on the causes of non-compliance. ICD/PIT-CNT (2000) compared the 
actual earnings of self-employed workers to the minimum fixed contribution, and analysed the net 
benefits those workers would accede to by contributing. This study concluded that the rules of the 
system did not suit most workers in this category.  From a political economy perspective, Forteza 
(2003) emphasised the fact that different governments allowed contributory pensions to be paid to 
people who did not meet the requirements. He claimed that the political system tolerated these 
deviations because they attracted political support. Insofar as the willingness to exchange votes for 
pensions was greater among the poor, non-enforcement worked as an informal redistribution policy 
and, hence, was quite popular, although the rules for compliance were unclear.   
Finally, Amarante (2002) estimated the wage differential between public servants, formal 
private workers and informal workers over the period 1991–2000 using yearly cross-section data. She 
disaggregated the average gap, in line with Oaxaca’s proposal, and found that informal workers had the 
lowest earnings, given the characteristics. She also fitted a quantile regression model of earnings, 
including dummy variables –among others covariates- that captured the three labour categories (public 
sector, and formal and informal private sector). She found that informal workers received the lowest 
earnings in all the quantiles, but the disadvantage decreased with the quantile.  
2.    Data and method of estimation 
Let wj be the earnings of a worker j, xj his observable characteristics, f and i two sub-indexes 
that denote formality and informality. We specify the following relationship: 
( 1 )  j i v j i x i j i w , , , ln + = α         
( 2 )   j f v j f x f j f w , , , ln + = α        
If we assume that the disturbances v (which summarize the effects of non-observable variables) 
have a zero mean and are not correlated with observable variables, the coefficients can be estimated by 
OLS. Denoting the mean of the variables with a bar and making some calculations, we can disaggregate  
the raw earnings gap between sectors as the sum of two components, as proposed by Oaxaca (1973):  
( 3 )   ( ) ( ) ( ) i f i f i f x x x wi w f α α α ˆ ˆ ˆ ln ln
' ' − + − = −     
The first term on the right is the difference among independent variables, and the second is the 
difference in the coefficients of the earnings equations. This last component –the difference not 
explained by independent variables- may be interpreted as the earnings gap computed in the mean of 
the characteristics.    10
The decomposition specified in (3) is based on returns in the informal sector and the difference 
between coefficients is weighted by the average characteristics of informal workers. However, structure 
rewards may be weighted by another stock of endowments, such as, for example, those of formal 
workers, as specified in equation (4) 
( 4 )   ( ) ( ) ( ) i f f i i f x x x wi w f α α α ˆ ˆ ˆ ln ln
' ' − + − = −     
Thus, we decide to estimate two proxies of the gap G1 and G2 as: 
 ( 5 )    () i f i x G α α ˆ ˆ 1
' − =     
 ( 6 )    () i f f x G α α ˆ ˆ 2
' − =     
These estimations have the same spirit as those estimated by Amarante (2002). They have the 
disadvantage of ignoring the endogeneity of the selection decision to be formal or informal. Suppose 
that an individual chooses to be formal or informal in accordance with his expected earnings in the two 
sectors. And suppose also that unobserved individual characteristics increase both earnings and the 
likelihood of choosing informality. For example, people with easy access to informal networks could 
enjoy greater potential gains by being informal. Then, observed income in the informal sector will be 
higher than expected income for the whole population, and the formal-informal gap estimated by OLS 
will be biased. 
There are different strategies to deal with this problem. We choose to estimate a switching 
regression model (Maddala, 1986) which means jointly estimating the selection rule that sorts workers 
between sectors and the earnings equation of each sector.  
A latent variable I* defines a variable I that takes the value 1 when the worker is informal and 0 
when he is formal. The variable I* depends on two different types of characteristics: those that affect 
the level of earnings and hence the choice of being formal or informal, and those that have a direct 
effect on this choice. By Z we denote the vector of both types of characteristics (which contains vector 
x), and the earnings-generating model may be described by:  
( 7 )   j j u z + = γ
*
j I          
( 8 )   otherwise if j 0 I ; 0 I 1 I j
*
j = > =       
( 9 )   0       I , , , ln = + = if j f j f x f j f w ε β      
( 10 )   1       I , , , ln = + = if j i j i x i j i w ε β         11
The disturbances u are potentially correlated with εi and εf. We assume that these residuals have 
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Hence we obtain estimations of the coefficients, the standard deviation of the disturbances of 
the selection equation (σu) and of the wage equations (σi and σf), the correlation coefficient between u 
and εi (ρi = σiu/σiσu) , and finally, the correlation coefficient between u and εf (ρf = σfu/σfσu).  
A positive value of ρi  may be interpreted as if unobserved attributes that lead workers to 
informality push the earnings in this sector up. For example, a high uj  of an informal self-employed 
person may be based on social networks that insure him against risks. At the same time, social networks 
may increase the informal self-employed person’s number of clients, thus pushing up his earnings. 
Pisani & Pagan (2004) use this estimation in order to test whether the informal sector attracts the least 
able workers. A positive value would indicate that this hypothesis may be rejected. Notice that ρf  is an 
indicator of positive or negative selection in the formal sector.  
We denote the density and accumulated density of a normal distribution by φ and Φ. These 
estimations allow us to predict the expected earnings in informality conditional upon observing the 
worker in the informal sector:  
( 11 )   ( )
() j
j
i i j i i j i j j j i j z
z
x x z u j i w E x I j i w E
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Notice that a positive ρi adds a plus to unconditional expected earnings in informality (βi xi), as 
would be expected if this sector attracts the most able workers (given observed skills).  
We can also estimate the expected earnings that a worker observed in informality would receive 
in a formal job (equation 12). A positive ρf  indicates that the expected earnings, given the selection 
rule, are higher than unconditional expected earnings.  
 ( 12 )  ( )
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j
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Therefore we can estimate another proxy of the formal-informal gap as the average difference 
between equations 12 and 11 among informal workers. We denote the number of informal workers as 
ni, and we calculate the gap G3 as:  
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The gap G3 is the difference between the earnings that an “average” informal worker would 
have received in the formal sector and his expected earnings in informality. It will be higher or lower 
than the non-conditional expected wage in accordance with the absolute values of the selections terms 
in (11) and (12).  
A fourth proxy of the earnings gap is a calculation of the difference between the earnings of an 
“average” formal worker and those he would have received in the informal sector, both conditional on 
being formal. The expected earnings in each situation are: 
( 14 )  ( )
() j
j
f f j f f j f j j j f j z
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( 15 )  ( )
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Thus, denoting the number of formal workers as nf, we calculate G4 as: 
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  Finally, the gap may be estimated as the difference between expected earnings in formality 
conditional on being selected as formal, and expected earnings in informality conditional on being 
selected as informal. Both terms are valued on the average characteristics of all workers. The gap thus 
defined (G5) is calculated for the whole sample (n= ni + nf) as:   















































In order to fit the earnings-generating models described above, we use the Continuous 
Household Survey (ECH - Encuesta Continua de Hogares) conducted by the National Statistics Institute 
(INE - Instituto Nacional de Estadística) in 2005. The ECH is a survey carried out in urban areas. As more 
than 90% of the Uruguayan population is urban, the survey gives a good representation of the country.   13
We restrict the sample to 18-to-59-years-old workers who declared they were paid or self-employed at 
the time of the interview. We exclude unpaid family members, domestic workers living at the house 
where they work and enterprise owners, except when the production unit was operated by a single 
individual (self-employment).  
The survey inquires into individual endowments (age, sex, marital status, schooling), labour 
characteristics (hours of work, industry) and income received in the preceding month, classified by 
source. Besides this, the survey reports whether or not the individual contributes to the social security 
system and/or is a DISSE beneficiary. When an individual has more than one job, we consider the 
characteristics of the main one –that is, the job that accounts for the highest earnings.  
Earnings are calculated as the sum of in-cash and in-kind labour income, including the in-cash 
regular wage, tips and bonuses. In addition, we estimate the amount of three labour benefits.  
First, when the worker is a DISSE beneficiary we add the regular cost of the monthly fee 
required to get assistance in the mutual insurance system.  
Second, we take into account that private and public paid employees have the right to receive a 
thirteenth monthly salary or wage. The ECH shows whether the worker receives this benefit. So in this 
case we add an amount equivalent to 1/12 of the monthly in-cash regular salary or wage.  
Third, by law, private wage earners are entitled to a payment of 2/3 of regular monthly 
remuneration to be paid when they have their annual holiday. The ECH does not capture whether the 
worker receives this benefit. However, when the worker is a private earner and states that he receives a 
thirteenth wage or salary, we assume he also receives “vacation pay”. 
3. Results 
3.1. Data description 
As can be seen in Table 1, in 2005 around of 36% of workers aged 18-to-59 were informal. 
Comparisons between sectors suggest that informal workers tend to be young and lower-educated. 
Indeed, informality accounts for 48.2% of youth employment (18 to 24 years old) and between 33 and 
35% of prime age employment. Many young people study and do part-time work at the same time, so 
informality at this life-cycle stage has been seen as a desirable personal situation.  
Some 65% of workers with incomplete primary education are informal but 92% of those who 
completed the tertiary level are formal. Notice that informality is quite widespread among workers with 
incomplete tertiary studies (21%), but this figure is affected by the heavy weight of young students in 
the group.    14
As mentioned above, at the beginning of the 1990s informality was higher among women than 
men and that the gender gap steadily narrowed during that decade (Bucheli, 2004). The figures in Table 
1 show that in 2005 the rate of informality was higher among men than women, but the difference was 
quite small. 
Firm size appears to be closely correlated with formality. The group of self-employed workers 
who do not use physical capital (94%) have the highest percentage of informality. In contrast, 
employees in private firms with more than 10 employees (90%) and public servants (99%) have the 
highest rates of formality.   
As regards industrial classification, workers are more likely to be informal when employed in 
the building industry (62%) and commerce, restaurants and hotels (46%). At the other end of the scale, 
there are high rates of formality in finance (96%) and electricity, gas and water (98%), which are 
activities with a low weight in employment (1%). Notice that public enterprises are the main suppliers 
of these services.     15
Table 1. Percentage of informal workers and average distributions by formality. 2005. 
  Average distribution 
 
Percentage of 
informal workers  Formal Informal  All 
All  35.8 100.0  100.0  100.0 
Age        
18 – 24  48.2 11.4  19.0  14.1 
25 – 49  33.4 67.8  60.9  65.3 
50 – 59  34.9 20.9  20.1  20.6 
Gender        
Male  36.2 54.6  55.6  55.0 
Female  35.3 45.4  44.4  45.0 
Level of education        
Less than 6 years  65.6 2.7  9.1  4.9 
6 to 8 years  50.6 22.9  42.1  29.8 
9 to 11 years  37.7 27.8  30.2  28.6 
12 years  26.0 15.9  10.0  13.8 
Tertiary incomplete  21.0 11.7  5.6  9.5 
Tertiary complete  8.2 19.0  3.0  13.3 
Employment type and firm size        
Public servants  1.3 27.9  0.7  18.2 
Wage earners in private firms  30.7 63.8  50.8  59.1 
     Less than 5 employees  62.4 17.9  66.9  32.9 
     From 5 to 9 employees  33.3 14.3  16.1  14.9 
     10 or more employees  10.0 67.8  17.0  52.2 
Self–employed 76.6  8.3 48.6  22.7 
     with capital  67.0 7.6  27.5  14.7 
     without capital  94.2 0.7  21.0  8.0 
Industry        
Agriculture and mining  40.6 3.8  4.7  4.1 
Manufacturing  38.3 14.7  16.3  15.3 
Electricity, gas, water  1.4 1.5  0.0  1.0 
Building  61.9 4.4  12.7  7.4 
Commerce, restaurants, hotels  45.8 20.0  30.1  23.6 
Transport and communications  22.1 7.5  3.8  6.1 
Finance  3.5 3.1  0.2  2.1 
Personal and Community Services  28.7 45.0  32.2  40.4 
Source: Encuesta Continua de Hogares (2005), INE 
 
3.2. Determinants of participation in informality 
The estimated coefficients of the switching regression model selection equation are given in 
Table 2. The set of explanatory variables contains variables also included in the earnings function: years 
of schooling; potential experience (age - years of schooling – 6) and squared potential experience; a 
gender dummy that takes the value 1 when the worker is a woman; a dummy showing that weekly   16
hours worked are less than 30 (part-time work); a regional dummy that takes the value 1 for the capital 
city and 21 dummies that distinguish different industries.  
In addition, we include the characteristics that have a direct effect on selection and do not have 
an indirect effect through the level of earnings: a set of dummies that capture position in the household 
(head, spouse, son/daughter, other relationship with the head -omitted-); a dummy variable that 
indicates cohabitation (legally married or not); a dummy variable that takes the value 1 when the worker 
is receiving a pension; an index of household overcrowding (household size / number of dorms) as a 
proxy of wealth; household formality defined as the ratio of formal workers to workers in the (rest of 
the) household.  
In previous Uruguayan and Latin American studies it was found that the likelihood of being 
informal decreases with education, is lower for women than for men, and is lower for people who do 
not live in the capital city. Experience is non-significant at the standard statistical levels. 
Other determinants of informality are job and sector characteristics. Not surprisingly, part-time 
work has a positive effect on the likelihood of being informal. We report the estimated coefficients of 
sectors in Annex 1. The sectors where informality is most likely are printing and furniture, building, 
wood and paper, the retail trade and textiles. On the other hand, workers in electricity, gas and water, 
education, the financial system and health are the most likely to be in a formal situation.   
Formality is more common for married workers, and it also depends on position in the 
household. Heads of households are the most likely to be formal and spouses are the most likely to be 
informal.  
The likelihood of being informal is greater for workers receiving a pension. Notice that, with 
only a few exceptions, people receiving a pension are forbidden to work, and it is possible to avoid this 
rule by having an informal job. 
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Table 2. Switching regression model: selection equation 
estimates (probability of informality) 
Variable Coefficient 










Household overcrowding   -0.234 
 (-12.10)** 
Household formality  -0.349 
 (-15.62)** 














Notes: Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses: * significant 
at 5%; ** significant at 1%.  
The estimation also includes a regional dummy and 21 industry 
dummies; the omitted category is agriculture 
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The negative estimated coefficient of “household formality” indicates that the likelihood of 
being informal decreases with the share of formal workers in the household. That is, informality is 
more likely for workers living with other informal workers. One way of explaining this is the hypothesis 
that there are barriers that impede entry into informality, such as the requirements of social networks. If 
this is so, the presence of informal workers in a household make it easier for other household members 
to accede to informal work. This would indicate that if family background is informal the benefits of 
being informal increase.  
Notice that we do not find evidence that if one household member is entitled to formal 
benefits, this acts as a disincentive to other members contributing to the social security system. This 
result is similar in other Latin American countries and, as was pointed by Auerbach, Genoni & Pages 
(2005), it could be due to unobserved household characteristics that are correlated with both household 
formality and the probability of contributing.  
We find a negative sign for the effect of household overcrowding. As this variable is negatively 
correlated with wealth, we may infer that the poor obtain less benefit through being informal. In 
particular, overcrowding is positively correlated with the number of children. So it is possible that the 
contributory family allowances program plays some role as an incentive to contribute to the social 
security system.  
3.3. Earnings differential 
We estimate three wage equations by OLS: one for formal workers, one for informal workers 
and another for the whole sample. In addition, we estimate wage equations for formal and for informal 
workers in line with the switching regression model. As mentioned above, the explanatory variables are 
years of schooling, potential experience and its square, and the above-mentioned set of dummies that 
capture gender, part-time work, region and industry. The OLS estimation for the whole sample of 
workers also includes a dummy that indicates informality.  
We report the results of all these estimations in Table 3. For all the estimations, we obtain the 
expected coefficient signs of the human capital variables. Earnings increase with experience at a 
decreasing rate, and rise with schooling. Both the OLS estimations and the switching regression model 
indicate that the returns to schooling and experience are greater in the formal sector than in the 
informal sector.  
In addition, as expected, earnings are higher for men, part-time workers and people residing in 
the capital city. The gaps due to gender, part-time work and region are greater in the informal sector.    19
Although the coefficient signs are stable, the coefficient magnitudes differ depending on 
whether or not we use the selection procedure. The returns to schooling and the gender gap are lower 
in the switching regression model, and the part-time differential is higher.  
 
 Table 3. Wage equation estimates. 
 
OLS estimates wage equation without 
selection correction 
Switching regression wage 
equations  
  All  Formal Informal Formal Informal 
Informal  -0.601        
  (54.81)**        
Schooling  0.096 0.097 0.095 0.079 0.064 
  (63.51)** (58.03)** (29.82)** (41.26)** (16.50)** 
Experience  0.034 0.034 0.032 0.032 0.028 
  (23.91)** (20.57)** (12.26)** (18.17)** (10.04)** 
Experience (squared)  -0.041 -0.038 -0.042 -0.035 -0.038 
  (13.46)** (10.58)**  (7.70)**  (-9.25)**  (-6.68)** 
Female  -0.218 -0.196 -0.246 -0.181 -0.228 
  (21.55)** (17.55)** (11.10)** (-15.38)** (10.02)** 
Part-time  0.394 0.384 0.397 0.610 0.677 
  (32.10)** (22.36)** (21.24)** (30.23)** (24.97)** 
Region  0.19 0.151  0.256  0.117  0.202 
  (19.99)** (13.68)** (14.39)** (10.97)** (10.70)** 
Constant  -0.601    0.079  0.064 
  (54.81)**    (41.26)**  (16.50)** 
Observations  18688 12263  6425     
R-squared  0.49 0.41 0.28     
σi        0.756 
σf      0.610   
ρi         0.571 
ρf        0.652   
Notes: Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses: * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%.  
The estimation also includes a regional dummy and 21 industry dummies; the omitted category is 
agriculture 
 
In Table 4 we present the results of the different estimates of the formal-informal gap. As 
Amarante (2002) found, the estimated gaps based on the OLS procedure indicate that earnings are 
lower in the informal sector. The raw gap is 0.86 and the proxies resulting from the Oaxaca 
decomposition are 0.61 (G1) and 0.58 (G2). Remember that the former figure is obtained by weighting   20
the difference of parameters by the average characteristics of informal workers, and the latter is 
calculated with the average characteristics of forma l  w o r k e r s .  T h u s ,  i n  b o t h  c a s e s ,  w o r k i n g  i n  t h e  
informal sector is less rewarded and the non-explained difference is 71% or 67% of the raw average 
gap, depending whether it is calculated as G1 or G2.  
 
Table 4. Gap in wage earnings between formal and informal workers: 






term  Mean Gap 







(D)  (E) 
Raw gap          0.860 
G1 3.632   
1/ 3.024   
1/     0.608 
G2 3.853   
2/ 3.276   
2/     0.577 
G3 4.268   
1/ 3.027   
1/ 0.312 
1/ 0.339   
1/  1.241 
G4 3.852   
2/ 2.879   
2/ -0.166   
2/ 0.180   
2/  0.973 
G5 3.759   
3/ 3.244   
3/ -0.237   
3/ 0.529   
3/  0.535 
1/ Weighted by the average characteristics of the informal workers. 
2/ Weighted by the average characteristics of the formal workers. 
3/ Weighted by the average characteristics of the whole sample. 
 
However, G1 and G2 may be biased if the peculiarities that determine wages are those that 
drive workers to each sector. The selection bias may be due to individual preferences or to the rationing 
in the formal sector. There is no consensus about how workers sort themselves or are sorted between 
sectors. As explained in section 2, we choose to introduce a selection rule through modelling a 
switching regression specification and we calculate three additional proxies of the gap. Estimated gaps 
and their components are also given in Table 4. 
Let us first analyse the correlation coefficient between the error terms in the selection equation 
and the disturbances in each wage equation (ρi and ρf). Both correlation coefficients are positive and 
significant. A positive ρi means a positive selection term in informality (equation 11). That is, observed 
informal workers derive a comparative advantage from working in informality and so they are more 
successful than informal workers in a random sample. The prediction of informal earnings that stems 
from a non-selection procedure estimation, overestimates the expected informal earnings of a random   21
worker. Analogous reasoning applies to a positive ρf .1 Thus, the predicted earnings of formal workers 
obtained with a non-selection procedure underestimate the expected formal earnings of a random 
worker. 
These results suggest that unobservable characteristics do not contribute to explaining the 
positive values of G1 and G2. Indeed, the positive ρi indicates that informal workers are not drawn 
from the lowest part of the informal earnings disturbance distribution. Besides, as ρf  is positive, we 
may infer that formal workers are not drawn from the highest part of the formal distribution. 
In columns C and D of the G3 row in Table 4, we report the average selection terms involved 
in the estimation of G3, that is, the difference between the predicted earnings in formality and in 
informality, conditional on informality. The selection terms’ signs are driven by the correlation 
coefficient signs, as stated in equations 11 and 12. The selection term is lower when calculating 
conditional average predicted earnings in the formal sector (column C) than when doing so for the 
informal sector (column D). Thus, the difference between the selection terms is negative. However, the 
gap G3 is positive (1.241).  
The proxy G4 is the gap conditional on being formal. As formal workers also do better in 
informality, the selection term of conditional average predicted earnings in the formal sector is negative 
(column C). Analytically, it is the result of a positive ρf  in equation 14. On the other hand, formal 
workers do better in informality, which means a positive selection term when calculating conditional 
average predicted earnings in the informal sector (column D). Once again, the difference between the 
selection terms is negative but the mean gap G4 is positive (0.97). 
Finally, G5, the difference between earnings in formality and in informality, conditioned on 
being selected on the sector where the worker is observed- is 0.53.  
4. Conclusions 
In 2005, around 36% of employed workers between 18 and 59 years old were not covered by 
the social security system. This level of informality has been quite stable in the country in recent 
decades. This phenomenon is widespread in Latin America and there have been many studies that 
examine whether it is the result of the presence of segmentation through evaluating the earnings gap 
                                                        
1 This result may be surprising because one would expect that highly rewarded workers in the formal sector select 
themselves as formal. A similar result was found by Marcouiller, Ruiz de Castilla & Woodruff (1997) for Mexican 
men, but they did not find it for Mexican women or for workers in the other Latin American countries studied 
(El Salvador and Peru).   22
among sectors. In this paper we explore the patterns of the personal characteristics of informal workers 
and their jobs, and the extent to which their earnings differ from those of formal workers.  
The empirical results of the sectoral selection indicate that formality is more likely for people 
who are better-educated, women, residents in the capital city, heads of households and full-time 
workers. In addition, the likelihood of being formal increases with the share of formal workers in the 
household and household overcrowding. Job and sector characteristics also impact on the likelihood of 
being informal. Not surprisingly, informality is less widespread in activities in which the public sector is 
important in terms of production volume.  
In order to evaluate the earnings gap between sectors, we estimate five proxies that involve 
different procedures. First, we estimate a wage equation for formal workers and another for informal 
workers, and we use these to disaggregate the gap in line with the traditional Oaxaca decomposition. 
We find that after controlling by skills and other characteristics, the average earnings of formal workers 
are higher than those of informal workers. Then we look for a way to introduce the selection procedure 
underlying the sectoral status of workers. Secondly, we estimate a switching regression model and three 
proxies of the formal-informal gap.  
The results obtained through the joint estimation of sectoral selection and earnings indicate 
that the gap estimation needs to take into account a selection rule. The signs of the selection terms 
indicate that formal and informal workers are both more successful in informality than a randomly 
chosen worker. Thus, estimations without a selectivity correction overestimate informal earnings and 
underestimate formal earnings with respect to the expected values for a randomly chosen worker. We 
find that the three estimations of the gap that involve a selection rule indicate that earnings are lower in 
the informal sector than in the formal sector.      
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Table 5: Oaxaca-Blinder parameters and estimation 
  Parameters  Characteristics  Beta f- Beta i Beta f- Beta i
  Formal Informal  Formal  Informal  pond  XF  Pond  XI 
Informal  0.0 1.0  
Years of education  0.097 0.095 11.376 8.679  0.031  0.024 
Experience  0.034 0.032 21.652  22.717  0.048  0.051 
Experience (squared)  -0.038 -0.042  6.087  6.825  0.021  0.023 
Female  -0.196 -0.246  0.461  0.445  0.023  0.022 
Partial  0.384 0.397  0.117  0.371  -0.001  -0.005 
Resident of Montevideo  0.151 0.256  0.616  0.457  -0.064  -0.048 
Mining  0.167 -1.269  0.001  0.001  0.001  0.001 
Food products and 
beverages 
0.083 0.110  0.051  0.032  -0.001  -0.001 
Textiles  -0.090 -0.262  0.022  0.043  0.004  0.007 
Wood/Paper  -0.061 0.042  0.006  0.012  -0.001  -0.001 
Printing/Furniture  0.106 0.038  0.014  0.032  0.001  0.002 
Chemicals and petroleum  0.253 0.003  0.022  0.013  0.005  0.003 
Machinery and equipment  0.063 0.115  0.017  0.018  -0.001  -0.001 
Electricity, gas and water  0.418 1.106  0.014  0.000  -0.010  0.000 
Building  0.137 0.076  0.039  0.117  0.002  0.007 
Retail trade  -0.137 -0.067  0.116  0.205  -0.008  -0.014 
Wholesale trade  0.105 -0.090  0.040  0.039  0.008  0.008 
Hotels and restaurants  -0.026 0.132  0.025  0.031  -0.004  -0.005 
Transport  0.055 0.127  0.052  0.028  -0.004  -0.002 
Post and telecommunications 
0.235 0.027  0.017  0.006  0.004  0.001 
Financial services   0.739 0.513  0.032  0.002  0.007  0.000 
Services  0.033 0.180  0.083  0.078  -0.012  -0.012 
Education  0.072 0.330  0.096  0.017  -0.025  -0.004 
Health  0.091 0.097  0.108  0.028  -0.001  0.000 
Other  services  0.186 0.210  0.212  0.254  -0.005  -0.006 
Others  -0.515 -0.243  0.000  0.001  0.000  0.000 
Constant  2.085 1.528  1.000  1.000  0.558  0.558 
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Table 6: Switching regression model: selection equation estimates (probability of 
informality) and Switching regression wage equations 
  Selection Formal  Informal 
Mining -0.455  0.060  -1.331 
 (-1.08)  (0.28)  (-3.28)** 
Food products and beverages  -0.225  0.022  0.046 
 (-3.14)**  (0.59)  (0.71) 
Textiles 0.447  -0.008  -0.162 
 (5.67)**  (-0.17)  (-2.49)* 
Wood/paper 0.567  0.034  0.182 
 (4.78)**  (0.47)  (1.91) 
Printing/Furniture 0.739  0.232  0.216 
 (8.5)**  (4.33)**  (3.15)** 
Chemicals and petroleum  -0.124  0.215  -0.038 
 (-1.29)  (4.56)**  (-0.43) 
Machinery and equipment  0.272  0.095  0.172 
 (2.94)**  (1.86)  (2.15)* 
Electricity, gas and water  -1.330  0.288  0.667 
 (-4.60)**  (5.18)**  (1.42) 
Building 0.621  0.280  0.236 
 (9.66)**  (7.07)**  (4.50)** 
Retail trade  0.439  -0.066  0.037 
 (7.50)**  (-1.95)  (0.76) 
Wholesale trade  0.190  0.117  -0.043 
 (2.61)*  (2.94)**  (-0.69) 
Hotels and restaurants  0.191  -0.005  0.168 
 (2.41)*  (-0.12)  (2.48)* 
Transport -0.226  0.011  0.047 
 (-3.06)**  (0.28)  (0.70) 
Post and telecommunications  -0.151  0.188  -0.077 
 (-1.29)  (3.62)**  (-0.62) 
Financial services  -0.704  0.651  0.200 
 (-5.21)**  (14.88)**  (1.08) 
Services 0.1230  0.045  0.195 
 (1.88)*  (1.27)  (3.53)** 
Education -0.821  -0.072  0.057 
 (-10.39)**  (-1.93)  (0.68) 
Health -0.492  0.018  -0.067 
 (6-.89)**  (0.50)  (-0.94) 
Other services  0.038  0.177  0.213 
 (0.65)  (5.53)**  (4.23)** 
Others 0.554  -0.461  -0.116 
 (1.03)  (-1.39)  (-0.38) 
Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses: * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1% 
 